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  1Introduction 
In September 2007, the House of Representatives of the United States passed a bill on 
patent legislation (Reform Act of 2007 – H.R.1908). To become a law, the bill has to be 
approved by the Senate House and signed by the President. Anyhow, it is on its way. On 
December 2007, the new version of the European Patent Convention has become 
effective. It is a treaty, ratified by the 34 members of the European Patent Organisation. 
It provides a unified legal framework for granting and litigation of the European patents 
by the European Patent Office (EPO) for all the states members of the organisation. The 
treaty may be considered a further step toward harmonisation which in Europe is still 
backward
1.  
     These recent events, strongly advocated by institutional representatives, mostly from 
the commercial software industry, are the outcome of a renewed vibrant debate on the 
protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) which involves governments and 
private institutions, together with academic economists, software developers and final 
users. The debate has been fuelled not only by the growth of the “information economy” 
(Hall, 2007) but also by the changes that the software industry is undergoing due to the 
presence of two distinct modes of production and distribution of the software products: 
proprietary and open source software . 
     Since software industry plays a relevant role in the development of the economy, 
many governments look quite involved in favouring the growth of their industries. But 
while some government policies promote open source software (OSS), through 
procurement suggestions or subsidies to research, others tend to strengthen the patent 
system with the aim of improving the protection of IPRs. These policies may look 
somewhat contradictory. 
     The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces few stylized facts on OSS; 
Section 2, relying on a growing body of theoretical and empirical studies, analyses the 
consequences on competition and innovation of OSS in the software industry and 
Section 3, disputes the rationales of government policies supporting OSS and concludes 
with few policy recommendations. 
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1 The UE Directive on the patent system for Computer-Implemented Innovations (CIIs) has been reject by 
the European Parliament on July 2005.  
1. Stylized facts  
     Software  products,  as  all  the  information goods, are the outcome of the human 
ingenuity. They are complementary goods, easily replicable, almost at zero cost, with 
large network externalities. This is true specially for those products called software 
platforms
2 that are software programs whose functionality can be increased through 
interfaces (Applications Programming Interfaces) that permit to hook other software 
programs (Etro, 2007) and that put together a large number of people (customers, sellers 
and developers). When the number of users increases, also the value of these products 
increases to them. The software products are non-rival and non-excludable, two 
characteristics that they share with public goods. These market failures have been 
traditionally treated giving protection to intellectual property rights mainly through 
copyrights or patents system (Scotchmer 2004). Software product’s characteristics are 
common to both proprietary and open source software that differ, instead, for their 
mode of production and diffusion.  
     Proprietary  Software  (PS)  is  realized by hired programmers working along 
hierarchical procedures defined by private firms. PS is protected by patent and 
distributed through commercial channels under the payment of a licence fee.  
     Free
3 or Open Source Software
4 (OSS) is, on the contrary, the result of the joint 
work of a great number of contributors, usually unpaid, scattered throughout the Web 
which share their results, i.e. the source code of the computer program, that are   
therefore, publicly accessible. It can be copied, modified and even redistributed, under 
some kind of restriction to avoid the appropriation and sale by commercial firms. The 
OS licensing options more commonly used are GPL (GNU
5 General Public Licence) or 
                                                 
2 See Evans et al.(2006) for a detailed account on software platforms and multi sided markets. 
3 In this paper, free software or open source software will be used as a synonymous since the distinction 
lies mainly on philosophical ground. Free Software was the original term, while Open Source Software 
was coined later, in 1998. Members of the two communities may contribute to the same project but 
consider themselves to belong to different movements. 
4 A program is defined open source if it satisfies the criteria stated in the Open Source Definition which is 
a document prepared by the OSI (Open Source Initiative) foundation. 
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5 GNU is the acronym for GNU’s Not Unix. It is an operating system which looks like Unix but it is a 
free software. GNU/Linux is a combination of the two operating systems. copyleft licence
6 and BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) or non-copyleft licence. 
The GPL requires the full accessibility to the source code which may be modified but 
has to be redistributed under the same licensing condition. This explains why the 
licence is considered the most restrictive one. BSD, instead, is less restrictive and 
allows anyone to modify and sell derived products which include the source code 
released under that licence without disclosing the source code of the derived products. 
          The diffusion of desktop computers and their connections through network 
applications via Internet has created, in the early 90s
7, the right environment for the 
growth and diffusion of OSS. Apache, Linux, Mozilla are just few of the best known 
OSS.  
     Two features of the software market are now raising the interest of scholars and 
politicians: the growth of OSS  and the increasing attention of commercial firm for OSS 
products. 
 
1.2 The growth of OSS in the software industry 
In the market for web servers we can see, looking at the monthly web server survey by 
Netcraft
8, that the position reached by the Apache is really impressive (Fig.1). Starting 
in 1995, Apache has quickly gained market share, together with Microsoft-IIs
9 which 
appeared later in 1996, at the expense of the already existing software programs: 
NCSA
10 and Netscape (now included in Sun). In October 2005, Apache reached the 
70% of the market. Since then it has progressively lost market share and now it has a 
50% of the whole market and a 10% advantage over Microsoft-IIs. This is the smallest 
gap between the two. The increasing number of sites, which testify the growth of the 
market, is recently due to the growth of blog providers. Google is now the third operator 
of the market with a 5% share.  
 
                                                 
6 The term was chosen by Raymond to contrast the concept of copyright. 
7 See Graham and Mowery (2003) for a short account of the history of software industry in U.S.  
8 The survey monitors the web servers that actually develop web sites and started in  August 1995. 
9  Microsoft-Internet Information  Server is the web server of Microsoft. 
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10Apache has been derived from a public domain released by NCSA (National Center for Supercomputing  
Applications) a research center of the University of Illinois (Varian, Shapiro 2005). Figure 1. Market shares in the Market Web Server 
 
Source: www.netcraft.com, December 2007. 
 
In the market for server and desktop, Linux
11 is the best known OSS operating system. 
Information on the diffusion of Linux are very difficult to obtain since it can be easily 
downloaded with a click. Various sources try to give approximate estimates and 
suggests that the market share for server should be around 20-23% (Economides, 
Katsamakas 2006; Lerner, Tirole 2005) while the number of desktop users is in the 
range of 29 millions
12 or the 3-4% of this market segment. Even taking into account the 
copies of Linux distributed through commercial firms, like RedHat or Suse which 
assemble parts of the program and give it for free asking only the price for the 
complementary services offered, the data on the number of users are largely 
underestimated. On the contrary, data on proprietary software may be over estimated 
because very often people buy personal computer with preinstalled a PS and afterwards 
they install Linux. 
                                                 
11 Linux is not just a program but a collection of modules that can be assembled to form the “kernel”. The 
modules can be modified and customized according to user needs by software vendors (Varian, Shapiro 
2003). 
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12 The estimate, dated December 2007, is a guess of the author of the site (http://counter.li.org), where the 
users can register themselves on a voluntary basis, and it takes into account the fact that many users don’t 
care to get registered or don’t even know the existence of the site.      Linux is increasingly used by internet companies such as Amazon and Google and 
used as operating system in embedded software in mobile phones such a Motorola 
SCPL, Samsung Qtopia, the newest Google Android and other devices and web 
gadgets. 
     Linux’s share is due to increase also because it is adopted, or it has been suggested 
for adoption, by many European and Asian governments. Even the Department of 
Defence and the National Security Agency of the US government have adopted Linux. 
 
1.2 The role of commercial firms in the growth of OSS 
Another relevant feature of the software market is that firms are starting to work with, 
and not only to compete with, the Open Source Community. There is a number of ways 
in which they can do it. Commercial firms can provide complementary services to the 
OS products in order to make their use more friendly. They can subsidize open source 
projects or release some of their proprietary code or even contribute some of their 
patents into a “patent commons”.  
          This is the case of IBM which has decided to participate to more than 120 OS 
projects
13, financing the development of Linux with more than $1 billion, and has 
contributed 500 patents to the Open Invention Network (OIN)
14 a company established 
in 2005 with the mission to create an environment to promote, improve and protect 
Linux. The OIN is financed by firms such as IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, Sony and 
Google and has adopted an intellectual property model where the patents contributed are 
available, at no licence fee, to any person or firm or institution which agrees not to use 
its own patents against Linux. It is a kind of legal protection which favours investments 
by firms which embed Linux in their product or offer some complementary product. 
     Commercial firms decide to become part of an OS project if they expect to increase 
their profitability, when they work on complementary segments of the market or if they 
disclose some of their proprietary source code
15, or to decrease their costs of production, 
                                                 




15 IBM has released parts of its Cloudscape program; Sun Microsystems has released its StarOffice 
program; Hewlett-Packard has released its Spectrum Object Model-Linker to allow a better connection of 
Linux to its RISC computer architecture (Lerner, Tirole 2005). when they use open source code. When the commercial firms release some of their 
source code they are very often trying to involve the OS community in the improvement 
or development of some of their products. An example is given by Mozilla, a portion of 
browser source code released by Netscape in 1998. The final result of these decisions 
may be quite interesting, also from the users’ point of view, although they may bring 
about different problems concerning the governance of the new mixed project and its 
legal protection
16. The problem of the commitment of a commercial firm to the open 
source project has been solved sometimes choosing to release the source code through 
intermediaries: Collab.net acted for HP, while the Apache Software Foundation did it 
for IBM. 
     When the commercial firms use open source code some kind of legal problems may 
arise. But in this case what really matters is the degree of restrictiveness of the OSS 
licenses. An example is given by Microsoft which has incorporated source code from an 
open source product (BSD operating system) in its Windows 2000 and XP. This licence 
requires only to acknowledge publicly the use of a BSD’s code, that Microsoft did, but 
does not require to disclose the source of the derived work which has embedded the 
open source code itself (Krishnamurthy, 2005). Apart from this anecdotal evidence, 
there is a growing empirical literature which tries to shed light on the preference of the 
commercial firms for different OS licensing schemes (Koski, 2005; Bonaccorsi, Rossi 
2004). 
     Morover,  commercial  firms  buy  open  source companies. Sun Microsystems has 
recently bought MySql, the most famous open source database
17, to integrate it on its 
server and operating system Solaris. Microsoft has announced that it might buy open 
                                                 
16 The Mozilla case is a vivid example. After an initial attempt to disclose the Mozilla source code, which 
did not succeed in attracting the OS developers attention because the program lacked of modularity, 
Netscape restructured the program and released the new version of the source code. Once obtained the 
improvements from the OS developers, Netscape tried to bring the program back to a proprietary type of 
licence but the OS community complained about this decision. Eventually, Netscape chose to maintain 
the source code open under a new type of licence, the “Mozilla Public Licence” which protects the 
openness of the source even more than the GPL (Mockus et al. 2005; Lerner Tirole, 2005). 
  7
17 MySql has distributed more than 100 million copies and its users are Facebook, Google, Alcatel-
Lucent, Nokia and China Mobile. source companies revealing a first public acknowledgement of the creativity of the open 
source model which other commercial firms have already shown
18.  
    These  are  just  few  recent  examples  of how the OS products are changing the 
strategies of commercial firms and their business models. A growing empirical 
literature is now trying to assess the role of OSS in the software market looking not only 
at the size and the dynamics of the phenomenon but also investigating into the drivers of 
individual and firm motivations to choose the open source mode of production. 
 
2. OSS  on innovation and competition 
The stylized facts introduced pose now the question of why should OSS products be 
realized and innovated in a market where firms are driven by the profit incentive. 
2.1 OSS and the incentives to innovate 
The economic analysis of the innovation process starts from the study of the incentives 
and suggests two main views on the source of innovation and creativity which bring to 
different policy suggestions. For the “incentives school”, as Farrell and Shapiro (2004) 
call it, innovation is driven by returns. What matters for the innovators is the 
appropriation of the largest portion of benefit from their innovations. This way of 
reasoning is deeply rooted into the economic theory which argue in favour of the 
intellectual property rights protection. The introduction of a patent system has become 
the most common adopted policy to protect intellectual property, granting a temporary 
monopoly to the patent holder, in order to recover the costs sustained for the innovation 
and make enough profit to invest in further R&D activities. The loss in social welfare 
due to the monopoly prices is compensated by the gain brought to the community by the 
innovation. 
     The “openness school”, on the contrary, points out that there are other incentives 
apart from achieving profit. This view is grounded in the “open science” paradigm 
where scientists disclose and share the results of their researches and the commercial 
firm work with or finance scientific foundations (Dasgupta, David 2004). A behaviour 
which was very common in the early stages of development of the software projects, 
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18 In 1998, Microsoft had already expressed a private opinion on the effectiveness of OSS in some 
internal and supposedly secret documents which were disclosed subsequently and became known as the 
Halloween Documents. until the beginning of 1980s, when AT&T started to enforce its intellectual property 
rights on Unix, which was originally developed in its Bell Laboratories (Lerner, Tirole 
2005). 
     For the OSS contributors the incentives rely mainly within the mode of production of 
their programs. The most widely cited piece of economic analysis (Lerner and Tirole 
2002), on the motivations of OSS contributors try to give an answer to the startling 
question of why people, apart some kind of altruistic motivation, should devote their 
time in working at projects without pay. With a simple scheme of cost benefit analysis, 
the authors compare the opportunity cost of the contributor‘s time with the sum of her 
immediate benefit, due to fixing a bug or customizing an OS program, and her delayed 
benefit in terms of future career and peer recognition. These two incentives goes under 
the heading of “signalling incentive”, since the developers receive public credits for 
their contributions, and are considered the most relevant drivers in contributors’ 
motivation. But the findings of a growing empirical literature
19, reveal a more complex 
and rich motivational framework than that asserted by Lerner and Tirole. 
     The empirical studies suggest that individual motivations might be both intrinsic, i.e. 
the contribution has a value per se, and extrinsic, i.e. the contribution will bring external 
benefits. Contributors are usually driven by a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations and for many of them the intrinsic motivations (to enjoy their personal 
creativity, to expand and share their knowledge, to feel the sense of community 
identification
20) prevail over the extrinsic ones concerning future career and monetary 
rewards (Lakhani, Wolf 2005). This brings us back to the role of altruism and 
reciprocity and suggests that further investigations on individual motivations are 
required . 
                                                 
19The data are collected trough questionnaires administered by sample to OSS contributors or looking at 
the entire community or at the characteristics of the projects. The survey gives also insights into the 
personal characteristics of contributors. On average, the contributor is usually a male, with an average age 
of 30 years, highly educated, living in North America or Western Europe (Lakani, Wolf 2005; Hars, Ou 
2002; Ghosh et al. 2002). 
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20 To be recognised an hacker  is a sign of honour within the OS community which use this term to mean 
someone able to solve programming problems, to have fun and to share code with others. The meaning is 
quite different from that commonly used to identify someone who tries to obtain valuable information in a 
unlawful way and that should, instead, be called cracker (Raymond, 1996).      The empirical findings on the motivations of commercial firm, which have started to 
work with the OS community and support OS projects, suggest instead that firms are 
more likely to be driven by economic incentives (Wichmann 2002; Bonaccorsi, Rossi 
2004; Iansiti, Richards 2006) although the trust they enjoy within the OS community 
might be considered somewhat equivalent to an intrinsic motivation to work with the 
community. 
     In addition to investigate into the motivations of contributors, to join and to stay 
within the OS community, the empirical surveys give also significant insights into the 
organisational patterns of OS projects as well. The development of OSS is relevant to 
understand if and how it can empower the innovation process in the software market 
and if its organisational procedure could be adopted by the commercial firms as well. 
     Although  the  number  of  developers  and projects is very large and steadily 
increasing
21, the participation of each developer is usually limited to a small numbers of 
projects and only about 30% of the projects are developed by more than 5 contributors 
(Krishnamurthy 2002; Ghosh el al., 2002). Within each of these, so called, large 
projects one of the contributors is recognised as the leader of the project by the others. 
Usually she is the programmer who has started the project and has been clever enough 
to leave some relevant problems still unsolved for gaining further contributors to the 
project. Her leadership lies entirely on the trust she is able to obtain from the 
contributors of her project who share her objectives, follow her suggestions and work 
on a pure voluntary basis, mostly just for few hours a week. A good leadership is 
essential for the success of the project and to reduce the risk of forking, i.e. the splitting 
of the project or its development into a variety of applications which may waste 
resources of the community (Lerner Tirole, 2002). So the entire OSS development 
process looks much less loose than it is conventionally thought. 
     Two more features of the OSS innovation process look relevant. One is the fact that, 
since the source code is open and thousands of people are running OSS on their PC, the 
probability to get feedback from them is quite high. This is the so called “user driven 
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21 As recorded at January 2008, the number of projects and users registered on SourceForge.net is 
167.880 and 1.778.800 respectively with an increase of 400% if compared with the data on projects 
(39.000) referred in Lerner and Tirole (2002). SourceForge.net is one of the largest Open Source 
Repositories togheter with Savannah, Freshmeat and the GNU repository. innovation process” (Von Hippel, 2005) or demand side learning effect (Casadeus-
Masanell, Ghemawat 2003) and it represents another engine in the innovation process 
which is not shared with the PS whose users can, at most, send a note but cannot work 
on the source code even if they have the skill to do so. The other is connected to the fact 
that, lacking of economic incentives, the contributors may sometimes decide to follow 
more expensive research paths that could not have been followed in a profit driven 
context and which may instead turn out very fruitful.  
     When the knowledge process is cumulative, as often it happens for the software 
products, the disclosure of the results achieved turns out to be an efficient procedure 
because it permits to intervene from the very early stages of the development of the 
product and this explains why the number of OSS versions released is much higher than 
those of proprietary software (Bitzer Schroder, 2005; Krishnamurthy, 2005 ). 
     Released often
22 and under the scrutiny of a large number of interested experts, the  
OSS is considered by users and competitors a product of high quality, reliability and 
security for its adaptability to individual and organizations’ needs.  
     The OSS production mode based on voluntary networks, supported by an improving 
communications technology, and the accessibility of the source code is therefore a 
unique and not repeatable by commercial firms. Only few features of the OSS 
organisational procedure could be adopted. One is related to the organisation of the 
working time of their programmers. Leaving them free to work for few hours a day or 
week on some their own project or to work within OSS projects during their working 
hours, the commercial firms might try to increase the productivity of their own 
employees. The other feature refers to the fact that the commercial firms may try to 
improve the communications with its own users to take advantage of its own demand 
side effects (Casadeus-Masanell , Ghemawat 2003). 
     Motivations  and  internal  organisation of the OSS production mode are therefore 
relevant to understand if this process is efficient and how it contributes to the innovation 
of the software market. Another important aspect to investigate is whether the increased 
degree of competition on the software market, due to the emergence of the OSS 
products, can influence the innovation process as well. 
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22 “Release early, release often” is a leading principle within the OSS community (Raymond 2001).  
2.2 OSS and competition 
The stylized facts considered previously suggest that OSS products improve 
competition and extend the software market. The OSS have added further segments to 
the software market through the customization of software to satisfy more sophisticated 
users 
23 and it may represent a serious alternative to the proprietary products, when they 
compete on the same segments of the market. This happens, on the market of operating 
systems, with Linux, or on the market of web servers, with Apache. While on the 
market of desktop operating systems, which is a typical mass market of pre-packaged 
software products, the presence of OSS products is significantly lower.  
     In the segment of web server, Apache has been the first mover and this might explain 
its dominance for more than ten years. But the gap between Apache and Microsoft is 
almost closed now and the structure of this segment of the market is evolving toward 
duopoly. The increase in Microsoft share is mainly due to the growth of blog 
providers
24 such as MySpace, Windows Live Spaces which use its Internet Information 
Services (II-S). The decrease in Apache share is due also to the switch of sites at 
Blogger to Google's GFE which is emerging as a third competitor. The relative   
positions of the Apache and Microsoft are changing also within the different domains 
(.com, .org, .edu). It is interesting to notice that Microsoft has almost reached Apache in 
the .com domain (Netcraft, 2007
25), while Apache keeps its dominant position in the 
.edu  and  .org  domains. This might suggests that commercial firms still prefer 
proprietary software while institutions and non profit firms choose open source 
products. 
     On  the  segment  of  desktop  operating system, instead, OSS cannot displace the 
incumbent firm which has a much larger installed base and enjoys strong network 
                                                 
23 According to Bessen (2003) the inability of commercial software developers to offer a customized 
product can be considered as a case of  incomplete contract, because of asymmetric information and 
transaction costs, which brings about a market failure which OSS may correct. 
24Blog is a kind of personal diary or individual web page which anyone can put on Internet withe idea of 
sharing his or her own experience with others.  
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25The Survey is related  to servers which host over 5000 sites. In the .com domain, the share of Apache is 
around 43%, behind its average on server segment of the market, while Microsoft is 38%, that is over its 
own average (August 2007). In the .edu domain the values are, instead, 54% for Apache and 31% for 
Microsoft (June, 2007) and in .org are 47% for Apache and  35% for Microsoft. effects. Nevertheless OSS can increase competition, pushing the incumbent to lower its 
prices or to adopt different pricing strategies. Microsoft has been the first to move into 
the market of desktop operating system in1975. In 1985, Microsoft released the first 
version of Windows in 1995, and later on Windows 98, which included Internet 
Explorer, its own web browser
26, for free. Microsoft specialized in software but created 
strong vertical integration with the hardware side of the market. Microsoft signed 
exclusionary agreements with personal computer producers, with the aim to have its 
operating system preinstalled on their products in exchange of information on how the 
operating system could affect their computer architecture, and with Intel, the largest 
producer of microprocessors, in order to get the computing power needed to support its 
software platform  (Evans et al. 2006). 
     In  addition  to  its  bundling  strategy,  Microsoft has also followed an aggressive 
pricing policy setting the price of Windows lower than its near-monopolist position 
could have allowed
27 and has adopted a policy of price discrimination toward some kind 
of users
28. 
     Therefore, with aggressive commercial and pricing strategies and large investments, 
in each new version of its operating system software and applications, Microsoft has 
been able to keep its dominant position with a market share of 90%  compared to the 
5% of Apple, the most known hardware-software vertical integrated company, and the 
3-4% of Linux. 
                                                 
26 Netscape Communications and IBM were the first to introduce their own internet browsers in 1994, 
followed by Microsoft and Apple. In 1995, Netscape Navigator reached 80% of the market for this 
application. 
27 Hall and Hall (2000) have tried to quantify the effects of Microsoft’s behaviour. Since any computer 
producer can develop an operating system instead of buying Windows, Microsoft priced Windows in 
order to make self-supply unprofitable to computer maker. Assuming that the costs to develop a new 
operating system would be around $9 billion, to set the price of Windows at $60 instead at the monopoly 
price of $813 allowed Microsoft to keep its dominant position in the desktop operating system.  
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28 Microsoft has recently started to sell the last version of Windows Office (2007), which include in 
addition to the usual applications: Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook, few others such as Access, 
Publisher, OneNote and Groove, at 10% of its price to students of high school and college in the U.S. and 
Europe, with the declared intention to fight piracy. That offer, named “The Ultimate Steal”, might be 
interpreted, instead, as an attempt to induce students to chose a software product at a very low price and 
distract them from the temptation to download Linux in order to contrast the attitude of some government 
to introduce Linux in schools. Th is price discrimination policy looks more like a competition for the 
younger share of the market when users are at still sensible to some kind of “informational imprinting”, in 
the attempt to reduce what Lerner and Tirole (2002) call the “alumni effect”, instead of a fight against 
piracy.      But something is changing. From one side, Microsoft, alleged by antitrust authorities 
for adopting anticompetitive actions
29, has agreed to adopt less exclusionary 
arrangements with computer firms to give them and consumers the choice on alternative 
middleware, such as Windows Media Player
30 and Internet Explorer. Microsoft has also 
accepted to enhance the interoperability of its products with others. On the other side, 
some personal computer producers, such as Dell, are starting to sell their product with 
preinstalled Linux, while IBM and HP are actively contributing to Linux development. 
Intel, too, is working to improve the compatibility of its microprocessors with Linux in 
order to support Linux platform (Lintel) and become more independent from the 
Windows platform (Wintel). The OSS community is always very active and there are 
various attempts to improve the usability of OSS products which should attract the less 
sophisticated users.   
     To conclude, we notice that, although the desktop operating system has attracted 
wide attention, by scholars and institutions, what is ongoing in the server operating 
systems, as the recent attempt to acquire Yahoo by Microsoft, will be relevant for the 
future of the whole market. 
2.2.1 Theoretical and empirical findings      
Many analytical studies have tried to compare costs and benefits of commercial and OS 
software in general terms or comparing directly Linux to Windows as the best products 
available, although non entirely representative, of the two sets (Varian, Shapiro 2003). 
What is taken into account in these cost/benefits analysis is the total cost of ownership 
                                                 
29 That binding strategy, gave rise in 1998 to a famous and much debated antitrust case U.S. v/ Microsoft. 
According to allegations, Microsoft adopted anti-competitive actions in the attempt to maintain 
unlawfully its monopoly. Netscape browser, in fact, could be run on different operating system and, in 
conjunction with Java- a new programming language, created by Sun Microsystems in the same period, 
that allows programs to be run on any operating systems -, could attract many application developers and 
become a platform in competition with Microsoft.   
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30 Microsoft adopted again, in the following years, its binding strategy combining Windows with Media 
Player. This gave rise, together with the allegation of lack of interoperability information necessary to 
allow competition in the work group server operating system market, to another antitrust case by the 
European Commission for abuse of dominant position. The Commission’s decision, taken in 2004, was 
confirmed by the European Court of Justice in September 2007. Microsoft has been required to pay a fine 
of € 497 millions, to release a version of Windows without Media Player and to supply interoperability 
information, licensing communications protocols between Windows users and non-Windows servers. 
This last requirement is much debated since the level of interoperability required by the Commission, will 
require, according to Microsoft, to disclose the full functionality of Windows and give information on the 
working of Windows server to Microsoft’s competitors. (TCO) and the software quality. TCO is obtained adding the initial price of software to 
the costs of maintenance, user training and upgrading, spanning over the entire life of 
the product. Software quality is a multi dimensions variable whose components are 
usability, compatibility, stability or reliability, and security. Although these variables 
are difficult to compare, mainly in the case of quality, according to evidence, purchase 
price and usability are the drivers in desktop operating system while compatibility and 
security are considered more relevant in the server and web server operating system 
segments of the market. 
     Few  theoretical  studies,  instead,  have tried to formalize the effects of direct 
competition of OSS in software markets. These contributions use duopoly competition 
type models or the theory of market leaders to explain the behaviour of the firms and to 
give insights into the evolution of the market. The duopoly competition models stylize 
different market features and the underlying assumptions. Bitzer and Schroder (2005) 
proposes a duopoly model where competition is on technology, instead on price or 
quantity, and show that the evolution of market structure toward a duopoly has a 
positive impact on innovation. Mustonen (2003) addresses the constraints that 
proprietary software monopolist faces, both on the programmer labour market and on 
the product market, in the presence of OSS. If the implementation costs of the OSS are 
sufficiently low, some customers will choose OSS and the monopolist has to take this 
into account in her pricing policy. Casadeus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) analyze 
competition between Linux and Windows in a dynamic setting. The OSS is 
characterized by a much stronger demand-side effect and Windows by a larger initial 
installed base. If Microsoft’s first-mover advantage persists in time and it uses its 
market power to price Windows strategically, Linux will never obtain the market 
leadership unless the cost differences between the two increases significantly or 
strategic buyers, such as Governments and large corporations commit themselves to the 
development of Linux. Somewhat different is the contribution made by Economides and 
Katsamakas (2006) which compare Linux and Windows operating systems as platforms. 
Therefore pricing decisions for the products sold to end users can be used strategically 
to influence the complementary applications markets. An OS platform, such as Linux, 
allows compatible proprietary applications from commercial firms which may have 
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assumptions, the model suggests that the firm can make more profit, providing 
applications to the OS platform, than being proprietary both of the platform and its 
applications. Etro (2007) applies his theory of market leaders to explain some stylized 
facts of software market. His analytical tool gives a strong theoretical ground to the 
explanations proposed by Schmalensee (2000) and Economides (2001). They suggest 
that, although market share implies that Microsoft is a near-monopolist in the market for 
desktop operating system, the competitive pressure that Microsoft has to face, also from 
OSS products, has refrained it from pricing Windows at a monopoly price and to set a 
much lower price. 
     In general, these contributions state that there is no evidence of a negative impact of 
OSS product both on innovation and competition. On the contrary, the competition 
between OSS and commercial products refrain the incumbent firm from exerting fully 
its market power, pricing lower and investing in innovation. 
     How can OSS contribute to the evolution of market structure becomes therefore 
relevant to evaluate the social welfare consequences and the policy decisions taken by 
governments (Casadeus-Masanell, Ghemawat 2003; Johnson, 2002). 
 
3. Government policies  
Governments may decide to support the growth of their national software industries 
adopting different policies which may affect proprietary or OS software or both.  
     Before starting to evaluate the relevance of different policies on the software market, 
it is worthwhile to remember that government defence-related spending in R&D and 
procurement had sustained the early development of software industry in countries such 
as U.S. and U.K
31. In the post war period, governments spending contributed to the 
development of computer technology, including the first attempts to separate software 
from hardware, and the training of researchers in computer science, a new academic 
discipline that joined basic research to the development of hardware. In the following 
years, the private computer industry, already active on innovations, attracted high 
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31 See Mowery and Langlois (1996) for a detailed account on the role of government expenditures on 
evolution of U.S. software since the post war period. trained people from universities and built on the results of researches mainly funded by 
the government. Therefore the role of governments, financing the relatively open 
research environment of universities, has been relevant in the dissemination of 
information and the diffusion of innovations. At the same time, government supported 
the growing industry as one of the largest buyers of software, at least until 1980s. 
     More  recently,  governments  have  started to support OSS, mainly acting as a 
purchaser, for a variety of reasons. For instance, because OSS is considered less costly 
or more secure and reliable than the proprietary software or because it may level the 
playing field improving competition in the software market.  
     Governments can then support national software industries adopting policies that 
may affect directly these industries and their evolution. At the same time, policy 
interventions may take the form of a legal protection, as the adoption of patent systems, 
that are justified by the presence of some kind of market failure which prevent 
producers to capture the full value of their products 
 
3.1 Patent system   
The introduction of a patent system has become one of the most common way to protect 
intellectual property granting a temporary monopoly to the patent holder, in order to 
make profit and to recover the costs sustained for the innovation, and requiring the 
disclosure of information on the innovation. The loss in social welfare due to the 
monopoly prices is compensated by the gain brought by innovations. 
     The big challenge to the innovation process of the OSS comes from the legal system 
of protection given to proprietary software.  
     Without entering into the debate over the role of the patent system to protect IPRs to 
incentive the innovation process, few considerations on the analytical contributions may 
support the discussion over the opportunity of granting and redefining the length and the 
breadth of patent legal protection for software products that is relevant for policy issues. 
     Theoretical contributions on this subject suggest contrasting views when innovations 
are cumulative and sequential as for software products. The analysis deeply rooted into 
the incentives school asserts that patent system gives the right incentive to innovate, 
when the incumbent monopolists are leaders in the patent race, and suggest that 
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innovations are cumulative, the patent system can also be shaped to share the profits 
among sequential innovators (Scotchmer 2004). On the contrary, other contributions 
(Bessen Hunt, 2004; Boldrin Levine, 2007; Bessen, Maskin, 2006) underline that, 
because innovations are sequential, the patent protection may refrain other competitors 
to work on further developments. In this case the conclusion is that without a strong 
protection by the patent system the industry might have been more innovative. 
     The empirical literature, too, is unable to give unambiguous results
32. Boldrin and 
Levine (2007) going through more than twenty empirical studies have found week or no 
evidence that a tight patent system will increase innovations with the possible exception 
of pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. On the contrary they found evidence, 
for software patents, that to strengthen the legal protection has increased the number of 
patents and their scope and their strategic use but has decreased the investment in 
R&D
33 This does not proof that patents favour innovations but don’t exclude the 
contrary. 
    Both theoretical and empirical researches are unable to offer a clear cut answer to the 
role of patents on software growth process but the patent system is already well rooted  
into the legal system. As Fritz Machlup said, recalling a quote due to Edith Penrose:  
     ”If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible to recommend 
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it”  
     So, most probably, patent system is here to stay, but the leading USA experience 
points out the need of some deep changes in the patent law.  
3.1.1 The U.S.lesson    
The debate surrounding the legal protection of software market, which is taking place 
now in U.S.
34, can contribute to understand the on-going discussion on the role of 
governments and suggest few answers to some significant policy questions that other 
                                                 
32 The empirical studies on patents and innovations are often criticized because of the definition of patents 
adopted, or the data and methods of analysis used 
33 See also Bessen and Hunt (2004) and Mann (2006). See Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) for an 
analysis of the effects of Japanese patent law reforms. 
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34 See, for example, (Graham and Mowery 2003; Bessen and Hunt, 2004; Hall 2007). countries are facing too. In a global economic environment, despite some changes in the 
location of new software products
35, the U.S. software industry will, undoubtedly, 
continue to have a dominant role
36 (Arora 2007). Moreover U.S. patent system is 
considered the most protective of all and U.S. have been very active in promoting a 
process of harmonization of patent systems across countries and in supporting 
international agreements, such as the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organisation. The TRIPS agreement has introduced 
the protection of IPRs into multilateral trade agreements and has defined the guidelines 
to national laws. 
     Many relevant features characterize the U.S. model which is considered, in every 
respect, a “first mover”. In fact, the U.S. has been the country where the software and its 
market has been created and the movement of software programmers, which gave rise to 
the open source community, appeared first. In the U.S., the protection of software 
related IPRs was first introduced and has become progressively more stringent. In the 
1970s, computer programs were protected under the copyright law
37 but in 1981, the 
Supreme Court introduced a principle that allowed the patentability of computer 
programs
38. In the following years many courts allowed software inventions to be 
patentable and many patents were granted. While the legal protection of software trough 
copyright law decreased continuously, the courts and the Courts of Appeal Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) rulings
39 strongly increased the protection through patents, although the 
U.S. congress has never legislated to grant patents to software. The rapid growth of 
software patent applications, due also to the diffusion of business methods
40on the 
internet, has overburdened the patent office and, given the lack of specialised expertise 
on that subject, has increased the period of application examination and reduced the 
                                                 
35 Ireland, India and Israel are the countries with the most active national software industries. 
36 According to OECD annual report (2004), 8 over 10 of the top software firms are in U.S. 
37 In that period, computer programs, as they were named, were assimilated to mathematical algorithms 
and, as such, not patentable. In the 1980 they were included in the U.S. Copyright law. 
38 In the Diamond v. Diehr case, the Supreme Court required the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
to grant patent to an invention largely based on a computer program.  
39 In 1994, In re Alappat, the CAFC stated that a mathematical algorithm loaded in a computer device has 
to be treated as a new physical device and therefore patentable thus eliminating the distinction between 
software and other inventions.  
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40 The business method patents are patent on methods of selling products over the internet. One of the 
best known is the one-click patent granted to Amazon which used it to sue Barnes & Noble.  quality level of patents
41. An increasing number of patents, due also to IPRs 
fragmentation 
42, tend to create a “patent thicket”
43, that is a set of patents that protect 
overlapping IPRs and requires multiple licenses from patentees. Both fragmentation and 
patent thickets increase uncertainty in the market, for fear of infringements and 
litigation costs
44. 
     Therefore, the patent system has changed the industry organisation inducing large 
companies to increase strategically their patents portfolio to prevent entrance, to stifle 
innovations and to favour patent partnership and cross licensing agreements in order to 
protect themselves from litigation. So the licensing of software is indeed become an 
activity in itself, not only for firms with large portfolios but also for the so called 
“patent trolls” which act as intermediaries developing, acquiring and licensing patented 
technologies without producing any software. 
          Progressively, the issue on low quality patent and high litigation costs has 
overshadowed the issue on the relevance of patents to innovation. A number of legal 
and economic scholars and governmental institutions, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission (2003) and the National Academy of Science (2004) and the USPTO 
(2003), have started to recommend changes to the patent system. Suggestions
45 were 
mainly intended to simply the administrative procedure, to improve the patents quality, 
to reduce market uncertainty and to improve harmonization with the European and 
Japanese patent examination systems.  
     The bill on patent legislation, approved recently by the House of Representatives, 
tries a few steps in that direction. Switching from first-to-invent to first-to-file is the 
most relevant change related to the priority given to patent application and bring U.S. 
patent system more in line with every other country’s patent system. Other changes 
                                                 
41 Patent law require that an invention has to be new, useful and non-obvious. The quality is related to the 
degree of novelty. For instance an invention may be already in use but not yet patented (Hall, 2003). 
42 According to Mark Webbink, vice president of Red Hat, an example of this strategy is given by 
Microsoft that has 14 patents on positioning and movement of a cursor. In particular, one invention refer 
to add and delete white space on a document that is protected by two different patents: one to add and the 
other to delete the white space. 
43 See on this point Shapiro (2001) and Evans and Layne-Farrar (2004). 
44 The cost of litigation has been estimated in $ 1.5-2 millions per side, per claim (Webbink, 2005). 
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45 The remedies suggested to tighten the evaluation standards of the requirement of non-obviousness, to 
give special attention to the scope of the patentable invention, to give publication to all patent application 
after 18 months and to provide more resources and experts to improve the patent examination procedure. limit the amount of damages imposed on patent infringers, refer to the conditions of 
patentability and introduce of post-grant review procedures which should improve the 
quality of patents. 
     The bill is still at the centre of the debate. Before passing in the House, it has been in 
the works, in different forms, for more then five years and it might not be approved in 
the present version by the Senate or even signed by the President. Contenders of the bill 
point out that the changes introduced to the patent system will not make the granting 
procedures significantly more efficient and that the bill does not take into account that  
industries have different innovation paces. 
     Therefore, even if analytical contributions suggests that patents are controversial in 
software industry we observe that, in the real world, commercial firms continue to 
increase their patent portfolios, public and private institutions suggest to strenghten the 
patents legal protection and politicians debate over how to improve the patent system. 
     The relevant question, for the purpose of this paper, is whether the patent system and 
its changes may build barriers to threaten the OSS innovation process and its growth in 
the software market (Lessing, 2003). Given the cumulative character of software 
innovations and the increasing number of patents, a real problem is connected with the 
risk of intellectual property rights infringements and the changes introduced by the new 
bill 
46 will not improve the present situation. Although a large commercial firm, such as 
Microsoft, claims that OSS infringes more than 230 of its patents but don’t proceed to 
enforce its patents, others, such as patent trolls, have started to file suit against OSS 
vendors
47. These legal issues might became more relevant for the development and, 
even more, for the diffusion of OSS because of the concern expressed by potential 
licensees about patents infringements when using OSS. However a number of non-
profit entities born around the Community, such as Linux Foundation, the Software 
Freedom Law Center and the gpl-violations.org
48, are starting to provide legal advices 
and services to defend producers and vendors of OSS and, at the same time, to protect 
                                                 
46 For instance, the Software Freedom Law Canter has expressed its concern on a provision of the bill that 
eliminate the request of the re-examination of patents by members of the public to the U.S. Patent Office. 
47 IP Innovation and Technology licensing Corporations, patent trolls filed a suit against Rad Hat and 
Novell. 
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48 The gpl-violations.org is an organization founded by Herald Welte with the purpose to prosecute 
infringements of GPL and did it for all the enforcement actions in Germany. Linux and other open source products against the infringements of their licences by 
commercial firms. 
 
2.2 Procurement and subsidies 
Governments may promote OSS products choosing or suggesting the choice of open 
source instead of proprietary software in all public administrations, schools and 
universities. Governments can also decide to fund software R&D. In this Section, we 
shall try seek the economic rationales that may justify the government decisions to 
support OSS products.  
     The increasing usage of OSS by governments is proved by a long list of anecdotal 
evidence and some systematic empirical evidence, obtained through surveys. Examples 
are given by European countries, U.S. and many other countries around the world. In 
Europe, some governments have decided to promote, software projects that disclose the 
source code, such as France, Germany
49 and Italy
50, or to consider OSS alongside 
proprietary software in procurement, as in U.K. In U.S., the NASA has adopted Open 
Source solutions to program its Mars projects. In 2007, the government of South Africa 
has decided, to migrate to OSS and the Russian government has decided to migrate all 
schools to GNU/Linux by 2009. 
     The European Union sponsored a very extensive survey on the usage of free (libre) 
and open source software (named FLOSS) by firms and public institutions in 13 
European countries. The FLOSSPOLS final report (Ghosh et al., 2005), on the local 
governments, shows that about 49% of the participants in the survey use, on average, 
open source products and that the use of the Linux, as operating system, is much larger 
than its use on desk-top. Although the results suggest a growing attention by 
governments towards FLOSS, there exist some significant differences between 
European countries. Spain, Austria, Italy, Germany, Sweden and Belgium, are over the 
average countries’ share of FLOSS users, while France is close to the average and the 
                                                 
49 The German government passed, in 2001, a resolution “Germany’s Economy in the Information 
Society” to promote OSS. 
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50 Directive by the Minister of Innovation and Technologies, December 2003 (G.U. 7 February 2004, n. 
31). See also the survey od the Minister of Innovation and Technologies (2003) on the usage of the OSS 
in Italian Public Administration. U.K. is fairly behind. The survey came out with the conclusion that, although FLOSS 
has not become a standard, the positive attitudes towards open source suggest that the 
usage of FLOSS is due to increase but not to replace proprietary software.  
     In Italy, the national agency for ITC in Public Administration, in its 2006 annual 
report (CNIPA 2006), refers that 72% of national and local administrations use OSS on 
their servers, compared with 54% in 2003, but 9% only use it on desk-top. These results 
are in line with those presented by the European FLOSS survey. It is interesting to 
notice that the relevant motivations for choosing OSS are lesser costs (56%) and fast 
acquisition (29%).  
    Cost saving advantages, a motivations given by the Italian Public Administrations, is 
one of the economic rationale behind the choice of OSS products that cannot, therefore, 
be compared to a government intervention on the software market. 
     Besides to reduce the total cost of ownership (TCO), which should improve their 
static productive efficiency, governments may consider other motivations as well. To 
lessen of the risk of vendor’s lock-in and to have open access to the source code allows 
public administrations to adapt the software to their needs, reducing the dependence on 
single providers and improving the level of security and protection of sensible 
information belonging to governments and citizens.  
     In  addition,  to  support  the  usage  of OSS products in public administrations, 
governments can and do promote their adoption in school and universities. Here, the 
motivations are not only the reduction of costs, as before, but also the construction of an 
open and stimulating environment which help to enhance the skills of future manpower 
that have to cope with fast changing requirements. 
     Although the government decisions to adopt OSS are driven by economic rationales, 
as we have just seen, critical voices against the adoption of OSS suggest that the 
increase in the OSS market share, due to the adoption by government agencies, may 
reduce social welfare when competition is between two or more compatible products. 
The argument is that, since commercial firms can’t compete for that share of the market, 
they may increase the price of their software and, because of the reduced size of the 
market, their incentive to innovate will be reduced as well (Schmidt Schnitzer, 2003; 
Evans Reddy, 2002). This view can be contrasted with the findings in Section 2 that 
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a relevant role in the software market with regards both to competition and innovation. 
If so, the role of government, as a buyer, will help to increase the OSS market share and 
to level the playing field.   
     Another  government  intervention  in  software market is the funding of software 
projects. Here again U.S. have a prominent position because government’s spending in 
R&D software are substantial
51 and much in line with the tradition of supporting basic 
research
52 through government research centres and universities. Since basic research 
are considered as a public good with large positive externalities that cannot be 
internalized, government funding represents the solution to this market failure and 
allows to reach the social optimal level of research. Although the strong economic 
motivation to fund basic research is uncontroversial, free-market supporters contend 
that the results of public funded research could be disseminated under the restrictive 
GPL licence and suggest the BSD licence or the dissemination to public domain. So the 
dissent is on the policy of funding research to support software that will be released 
under GPL licence (Evans Reddy, 2002; Lessing, 2003) and not on the subsidies to 
research. 
     To conclude, we underline that public policies in support of OSS may induce two 
further effects that enhance the productive efficiency of the whole economy, in dynamic 
terms. When governments promote OSS in public administrations and in education, 
they improve the training of highly educated manpower and provides an open 
computing environment that favours the development of its national software industry 
(Varian, Shapiro 2003). When governments fund software research and allows to 
protect the results of these research by the GPL licence, the new knowledge and the new 
inventions will be freely available to anyone increasing the collective knowledge and 
avoiding appropriation by commercial firms,. 
     Although, sometimes the rationales seem to be based on ideology, as some anecdotal 
evidence may suggests, there are strong economic rationales for promoting the adoption 
                                                 
51 The most famous is the “Beowulf Linux Cluster”, a software for Linux developed by NASA. 
52 Some countries have, instead, invested in the development of local versions of Linux. China has  
financed Red Flag Linux, and India is doing the same with a Hindi GNU/Linux called Indix. 
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 of OSS by national and local governments. As we have seen those economic rationales 
aim to improve efficiency, both static and dynamic, and to correct the market failure, 




Software industry is a fast growing sector of the economy which is undergoing 
significant changes both for the presence of the open source mode of production and for 
the challenges of globalization and convergence with other industries, such as mobile 
phones.  
     As we have seen in Section 1, new strategies and new business models are emerging 
as a consequence of OSS presence. OSS is changing the industry organisation, because 
commercial firms are adopting new business models,. OSS is also shaping the market 
through the emergence of new subjects such as the OIN and the Foundations. OSS has 
induced the profit seeking firms to rethink both their mode to produce intellectual 
products and how to protect them. Patents commons and creative commons experiments 
testify the need of a deep change in the patent system and suggest that the idea of “one 
size fit for all” cannot work any more.  
     In Section 2, we have considered different government policies. We have discussed 
the role of IPRs legal protection for software products and found strong economic 
rationales for supporting the adoption of OSS products by governments. As a 
consequence, we suggest that governments should choose a combination of different 
policies instead of adopting the so-called “government neutrality” that requires only to 
protect market competition, given the existing patent system. But the adoption of this 
combinations of policies, requires to fulfil some assumptions on the existence of market 
failures and on the role of IPRs legal protection. In brief: 
•  If there is a market failure in the private production of knowledge, then legal 
protection can offer some remedies; 
•  If research have large spillover effects and don’t attract private investment then 
government’s spending remedies the market failure; 
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copyright
53 and patent system; 
•  If a patent system is considered an appropriate solution for software products, it 
has to be shaped to take into account that the software industry has: 
o  a technological pace faster then other industries, therefore a 6-8 years 
period would an adequate length; 
o  a cumulative and sequential innovation process that requires to reduce 
the breadth; 
o  strong network effects that requires to improve interoperability and 
possibly the disclosure of some of the source code. 
This means that, in order to balance public and private interests, the patent system has to 
change, but not in the direction of increasing the legal protection as it has been 
suggested recently by some scholars and institutions
54. 
     The problem of balancing public with private interests gets even more complicated 
when we consider globalization. This is indeed a subject on its own. Here, we just want 
to underline that the globalization is not only a challenge to the development of the 
software industry, because the developing countries tend to promote OSS products, but 
also to the system of IPRs legal protection. The definition of an international IP regime 
with minimum standards requirements will probably avoid to consider the IP protection 
as a new kind of trade restriction. 
          To conclude on the role of OSS products we can say, with Varian and Shapiro 
(2003), that OSS is here to stay. OSS will go on fuelling the debate among scholars 
because it challenges some relevant pieces of economic theory such as the theory of 
economic incentives, of labour organization and that of the private provision of a public 
good. 
                                                 
53 Copyright protection for software are recommended by scholars (Webbink 2005) and Institutions 
(Deutsche Bank Research 2004). 
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54 See the Gower Review on Intellectual Property (2006). References 
Arora A., Forman C. (2007), Software, W.P., Carnegie Mellon University, February. 
Bessen J. (2003), What Good is Free Software? in Government Policy towards Open 
Source Software edited by Hahn R., AEI-Brookings Joint Center For Regulatory 
Studies, Washington. 
Bessen J., Hunt R. (2004), An Empirical Look at software Patents, W. P., n. 03-17/R. 
Bessen J., Maskin E. (1999 revised 2006), Sequential Innovation, Patents, and 
Imitation, W.P., Boston University School of Law and Princeton University. 
Bessen J. (2005), Open Source: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods, W.P., Boston 
University School of Law and Research on Innovation, July. 
Bitzer J., Schroder P. (2005), The Impact of Entry and Competition by Open Source 
Software on Innovation Activity, W.P. 2005-12,International Business Section, Free 
University of Berlin. 
Boldrin M., Levine D. (2007), Against Intellectual Monopoly, 
http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/intellectual/againstnew.htm, January. 
Bonaccorsi A., Rossi C. (2004), Contributing to the common pool resources in Open 
Source software. A comparison between individuals and firms, W. P., Sant’Anna 
School of Advanced Studies Institute for Informatics and Telematics (IIT-CNR), 
Pisa, Italy 
Casadeus-Masanell R., Ghemawat P.(2003), Dynamic Mixed Duopoly: A Model 
Motivated by Linux vs. Windows, Harvard Business School, W. P. 04-012. 
Dasgupta, David  P. (2004), Towards a new economics of science, Policy Research, 23, 
487-521. 
CNIPA – Centro Nazionale per l’Informatica nella Pubblica Amministrazione (2006), 
Lo stato dell’informatizzazione nella Pubblica Amministrazione, Relazione annuale, 
Vol.II. 
Denicolò V. (2007), Do Patents Over-compensate Innovators, W.P., University of 
Bologna, Bologna, Italy. 
Deutsche Bank Research (2004), Innovation in Germany: Windows of opportunity, 
no.583, June. 
Economides N., Katsamakas E. (2006), Linux vs. Windows: A Comparison of 
Application and Platform Innovation Incentives for Open Source and Proprietary 
Software Platforms, in The Economics of Open Source Software Development edited 
by Bitzer J., Schroder P., Elsevier Publishers. 
Etro F. (2007), Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust. A Theory of Market Leaders and 
Its Policy Implications, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 
Evans D., Reddy B. (2002), Government preferences for promoting open-source 
software: a solution in search of a problem, National Economic Research 
Associates, May.  
Evans D., Layne-Farrar A. (2004), The Battle over Intellectual Property Rights, 
Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, 9, 10.  
Evans D., Hagiu A., Schmolensee R. (2006), Invisible Engines. How Software 
Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
  27Farrell J., Shapiro C. (2004), Intellectual Property, Competition and Information 
technology in The Economics of Information Technology, edited by Varian H., 
Farrell J. and Shapiro C., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 49-86. 
Federal Trade Commission (2003), To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, Report, October. 
Ghosh R. A., Glott R., Krieger B., Robles G. (2002) Survey of developers. Free/Libre 
and Open Source Software: Survey and Study, FLOSS Final Report, International 
Institute of Infonomics, Berlecom Research GmbH.  
Ghosh R. (2005), Understanding Free Software developers: Findings From The FLOSS 
Study, in Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software, edited by Feller J., 
Fitzgerald S., Lakhani K., The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Ghosh R., Glott R. (2005), Usage of and Attitudes towards Free/Libre and Open Source 
Software in European Governments. Results from the Governments Survey, 
Free/Libre and Open Source Software: Policy Support. MERIT, University of 
Maastricht. 
Gowers A. (2006), Gowers Review on Intellectual Property, HMSO, London. 
Graham S., Mowery D. (2003), Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software 
Industry, in Patents in the Knowledge–Based Economy, edited by Cohen W., Merrill 
S., Cohen W., National Research Council, National Academies Press, 217-258. 
Hall C., Hall R. (2000), Toward a Quantification of the Effects of Microsoft’s Conduct, 
American Economic Review, Paper and Proceedings, 90, 2, 188-191. 
Hall B. (2003), Business Methods Patents, Innovation, and Policy, W.P., E03-331, 
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
Hall B. (2007), Patents and Patent Policy, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23, 568-
587. 
Hars A., Ou S. (2002), Working for free? Motivations for participating in Open Source 
projects, International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 6, 25-39.  
Koski E. (2005), OSS production and licensing strategies of software firms, Review of 
Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2, 2, 111-125. 
Krishnamurthy S. (2002) Cave or community? An empirical examination of 100 mature 
Open Source projects. First Monday, Peer-reviewed Journal on the Internet. 
Krishnamurthy S. (2005), An Analysis of Open Source Business Model, in Perspectives 
on Free and Open Source Software, edited by Feller J., Fitzgerald S., Lakhani K., 
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Iansiti M., Richards G. (2006), The Business of Free Software: Enterprises Incentives, 
Investments, and Motivations in the Open Source Community, Harvard Business 
School W. P., No. 07-028. 
Johnson J. (2002), Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good, Journal 
of Economics and Management Strategy, 11, 2,637-662. 
Lakhani K., Wolf R. (2005), Why Hacker Do What They Do: Understanding 
Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, in Perspectives on 
Free and Open Source Software, edited by Feller J., Fitzgerald S., Lakhani K., The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Lerner J., Tirole J. ( 2002), Some Simple Economics of Open Source, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, L, 2, 197-234. 
  28Lerner J., Tirole J. (2005), Economic Perspectives on Open sources in Perspectives on 
Free and Open Source Software, edited by Feller J. J.,Fitzgerald S., Lakhani K., The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Lessing, L. (2003), Open Source Baselines: Compared to What?, in Government Policy 
towards Open Source Software edited by Hahn R., AEI-Brookings Joint Center For 
Regulatory Studies, Washington. 
Mann R. (2006), Patents and Business Models for Software Firms, American Law and 
Economics Association Annual Meetings, n.3 April. 
Ministero per l’Innovazione e le Tecnologie (2003), Indagine conoscitiva sul software a 
codice aperto nella Pubblica Amministrazione in Rapporto della Commissione. 
Mockus A., Felding R., Herbsleb J. (2005), Two Case Studies of Open Source 
Development: Apache and Mozilla, in Perspectives on Free and Open Source 
Software, edited by Feller J., Fitzgerald S., Lakhani K., The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Mowery D., Langlois R. (1996), Spinning off and spinning on (?): the federal 
government role in the development of the U.S. computer software industry, 
Research Policy, 25, 947-966. 
Natonal Academy of Science (2004), A Patent System for the 21
st Century, Strategic 
Plan, edited by Merrill S., Levin R., Myers M., The National Academy Press, 
Washington, D.C. 
Netcraft  (2007) Web Server Survey, Report, August 2007, June 2007. 
Netcraft  (2007) Web Server Survey, Monthly, December 2007. 
OECD (2004), Information Technology Outlook, Information and communications 
technologies, OECD Publications, Paris , France. 
Raymond E. (1996), The New Hacker’s Dictionary, The MIT Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts. 
Raymond E. (2000), The cathedral and the bazaar, O’Reilly. 
Reddy B., Evans D., Nichols A.(1999), Why Does Microsoft Charge so Little for 
Windows? Report, NERA Economic Consulting, January. 
Sakakibara M., Branstetter  L. (2001), Do stronger patents induce more innovation? 
Evidence from the 1988 Japanese patent law reforms, RAND Journal of Economics, 
32,1,77-100.  
Schmalensee R. (2000), Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, American 
Economic Review, Paper and Proceedings, 90, 2, 192-196. 
Schmidt K., Schnitzer M. (2003), Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic 
Policy Issues of The Software Market, Harvard Journal of Law &Technology, 16, 2, 
474-505. 
Scotchmer S. (2004), Innovation and Incentives, The MIT Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts. 
Shapiro C. (2001), Navigating the Paten Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-Setting, in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume I, edited by Jaffe 
A., Lerner J., Stern S., The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Varian H., Shapiro C. (2003), Linux adoption in the Public Sector: An Economic   
Analysis, Technical Report, UC Berkeley, December. 
  29  30
von Hippel E. (2005), Open Source Software Projects as User Innovation Networks, in 
Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software, edited by Feller J. J.,Fitzgerald S., 
Lakhani K., The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Webbink M. (2005), A new paradigm for intellectual property rights in software, Duke 
law and technology review, 12. 
Wichmann T., Spiller D. (2002), Basics of Open Source Software Markets and Business 
Models, Barlecon Research, FLOSS Final Report, Free/Libre Open Source 
Software: Survey and Study – Part 3. Berlin 
 